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First, I want to thank you for your invitation to this 
seminar. I am very happy to have this opportunity to 
exchange with all of you. I want to say that on behalf 
of international CIRIEC I am very proud that the work 
programme of the CIRIEC international scientific 
commission on « public services/public enterprises » 
chaired by Massimo Florio has resulted into the 
publication of this Handbook on State-owned 
enterprises. Because of the Covid pandemic, we had 
not enough opportunities to communicate about this 
publication and to exchange around it with number of 
managers of State-owned enterprises who are also 
members of CIRIEC. This is still to be done. 
CIRIEC will celebrate its 75th anniversary next year. 
Since its foundation by Edgard Milhaud in 1947 in 
Geneva, it brings together hundreds of people 
(managers and researchers) interested in the 
economics of collective interest, especially the State 
intervention in the economy including State-owned 
enterprises at national land local level. CIRIEC set up 
many study groups and organized many events to 
exchange ideas between managers and researchers, 
seeking for mutual enrichment.  CIRIEC realizes and 
publishes scientific books and articles on public 
enterprises as such, but also in relation to other forms 
of organizations that contribute to the collective 
interest such as what we call « social economy ».  A 
special mention to the Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, our international scientific 
review, that under the editorship of Marco Marini, has 
obtained a high scientific recognition.  
When we look at all the scientific work done during 
these 75 years, we may of course observe a few 
remarkable evolutions. CIRIEC was founded in the 
post-war period that was a kind of Golden Age for the 
State-owned enterprises, at least in Western 
European countries. As we know, there was a big 
move at the end of the 1970s. We entered then into 
the « privatization » period. In the cases where 
regulation was not necessary to insure a good quality 
service at a good price, privatization (and 
competition) were favoured by almost all 
governments. In the cases where regulation was 
necessary, regulation became the most important 
tool to pursue collective or public interest and the 
type of ownership became a secondary issue. CIRIEC 
experts have worked a lot on regulation, on definition 
of universal service, on the condition of provision of 
services of general (economic or social) interest, and 
so on. Quite symptomatic is the fact that CIRIEC’s 
international scientific commission on public 
enterprises that brings together many experts 
worldwide decided in 2002 to adapt its name and to 
become the commission on public services and public 
enterprises. The main entry point was henceforth the 
mission of public services, whereas the specificity of 
public ownership became questionable in times of 
regulation and competition. 
Then, again a big move in 2008. After 30 years of 
withdrawal of the State in fiscal, industrial and 
monetary policies, of supremacy of the private 
enterprise model and of market fundamentalism as 
Joseph Stiglitz said, heavy interventions by the States 
were the only response to the financial « subprime » 
crisis. In order to avoid reviving the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, all the governments implemented 
Keynesian policies and took over the control of private 
enterprises that became partially or wholly State-
owned enterprises. Of course this move was 
considered by many as a parenthesis.  Indeed, fiscal 
discipline was very quickly put again at the forefront 
of the economic policy of the States especially in the 
European Union; with as consequence, what was 
called the EURO crisis in 2011. And ten years later, 
again a worldwide crisis: this time a pandemic crisis. 
Again, very heavy interventions of the States, maybe 
never experienced before in times of peace. Public 
enterprises and public services have played and are 
playing a frontline role in the fight against the 
pandemic and for the maintenance of essential 
services (health and social services, transport, water 
and energy supply, telecommunications, waste 
collection, etc). This crisis reveals again the 
weaknesses of our economic system and the very 
deep inequalities that remain and are even increasing 
between countries and within each country. In this 
respect, it is to note that recent statistical reports 
highlight that disparities and inequalities rise more 
and faster within a single country, than between 
countries. This also reveals the role that public entities 
must and do play to deal with the challenges of the 
post-covid time: that is to develop collective action 
and to co-construct sustainable development policies 
that combine social and economic progress, 
environmental and health protection and 
preservation of resources.  The in-kind services and 
facilities offered by public enterprises and 
organisations, notably in the field of health and 
education but also in securing access to water, energy 
and housing, often prove to be more effective in the 
long run than cash transfers, which would then be 
used to buy those services. 
State interventions, public services and to some 
extent, State-owned enterprises are no longer “bad 
words”. There are currently many State-owned 
enterprises in all parts of the world, but they are 
different from those of yesterday as very clearly 
shown in the Handbook. They are very often different 
in terms of sector of activities, formal structure, 
governance, goals and missions, profitability, 
international activities and so on. I think that we may 
even say that a new type of State capitalism is 
emerging. I think that this new type of State capitalism 
is exemplified by Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
which are a type of State-owned enterprise that 
should be more closely analysed. 
There are different types of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
as shown in the Handbook. The best known are those 
funds created by States that have made use of 
budgetary surpluses generated from exports of raw 
materials. With these surpluses, the Sovereign Wealth 
Funds have bought equities, financial and real assets 
often in many parts of the world. Their main goal is to 
generate additional revenue in the future when the 
exports of raw materials will stop. It is a kind of buffer, 
a saving for the future generations. 
These funds very often follow a long-term strategy 
and in this sense, they are part of the co-construction 
process of sustainable development policies. Maybe 
the best example is the Norwegian SWF that “has 
been instructed to divest from fossil fuel-based 
projects and companies, and to plan investment 
according to a climate-friendly strategy”1 as 
mentioned by Stefano Clò. Moreover, the return is 
“ploughed back into the economy to improve public 
services for the benefit of citizens”2. In some other 
cases, we must mention that such public investment 
is also a way to control part of the economies of 
foreign countries; thus, diplomatic and strategic 
reasons can be found in some investment decisions. 
In many countries, we also find another kind of fund, 
in fact a kind of agency that manages and controls the 
shareholdings of the State in various enterprises, 
most of them located in its own country. The 
Sovereign Wealth Fund team analyses and follows 
these enterprises on behalf of the State. Such 
agencies only manage the State's participations, they 
do not take any strategic decision because it is the 
State which takes these decisions. They implement 
what the State has decided. In such cases, the funds 
                                                          
1 Handbook, p. 99 
2 ibid 
are holding companies that play a role of intermediary 
between the final shareholder that is the State and 
the enterprises in which the State holds a majority or 
a minority of shares. The public authorities keep an 
indirect but final control on their holdings and retain 
the power to take any strategic decision.  
These agencies have enough flexibility to attract high-
qualified people and to amass expertise in order to 
prepare and to implement the investment and 
strategic decisions. They have enough autonomy with 
respect to the public authorities to implement a long-
term vision. State-owned development banks and 
pension funds, especially public pension funds may 
play about the same role.  
The goals of this second type of funds are likely more 
oriented toward the current economic development 
of their areas. Of course, the maximisation of profit or 
of future return is still an important goal but such 
agencies may also promote investment and 
technological dynamism beyond what private 
enterprises would do. They may support emerging 
industries in which private enterprises may be 
reluctant to invest because of uncertainty and high 
start-up costs. They may fuel local “ecosystems” or 
“clusters” to support the development of multiple 
relationships between economic, social and scientific 
players. They may keep under State’s control 
enterprises in strategic activities (defence, energy). 
They may help private enterprises in restructuration 
process. 
 
I would like to point out two aspects of this evolving 
State capitalism. First, the fact that the holdings of 
those State funds are no longer limited to a specific 
type, for example minority shareholdings in private 
enterprises (with the private partners in charge of the 
management of the enterprise). They tend now to 
include a large variety of holdings that also cover 
majority shareholdings in private law enterprises or 
even shareholdings in regulated SOEs. For example, in 
Belgium, the federal investment company (SFPI) will 
receive very soon the majority shareholdings that the 
Belgian State holds in the Post office and in the 
telecom company, which were formerly State 
monopolies many years ago and which are today 
listed private law companies.   
The second aspect I would like to point out is the fact 
that this evolution illustrates the always stronger 
tendency to dissociate the role of the State as 
shareholder and the role of the State as regulator and 
garantor of services. This evolution reinforces also the 
visibility of the State as shareholder. It means, at least 
implicitly, that the nationality of the ownership rights 
matters and that the State wants to keep the 
ownership. I am sure that we may find theoretical 
models in which economists will explain that the 
nationality of the ownership rights is not an issue but 
we all know that in many investment and strategic 
decisions, institutions and location matter. 
Other Belgian examples are the transfer to the federal 
investment company of the totality of the shares of a 
commercial Bank, ranked 3rd in Belgium. The Belgian 
State completely holds this Bank since the 2008 crisis. 
In the Belgian Walloon region, the regional 
investment company that held only minority 
shareholdings in private enterprises (with the private 
partners in charge of the management) has recently 
received the majority shareholdings that the Walloon 
Region holds in an arms manufacturing company and 
in aeronautical equipment companies. 
We may find many other cases in other countries: for 
example in France with the APE (Agence des 
participations d’Etat), and in Québec with the Caisse 
des Dépôts et Placements. 
I think that we should look more closely at the role of 
the State as shareholder with this generalization of 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund model especially in a long-
term perspective. Next to industrial and financial 
policies, this model could also be developed to seek 
ways to deal with the financial burden of aging 
societies. 
 
At the local level, we can also find some kind of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: that is holding companies 
managing on behalf of local public authorities their 
shareholdings in various enterprises. Some of these 
enterprises can be active in not regulated activities; 
others in regulated activities for example in the 
distribution of energy and water, transport or waste 
collection. Again, we can observe the difference made 
between ownership and regulation. The funds are a 
tool to manage the ownership rights. Such cases at 
the local level are likely less frequent than at national 
or regional level. The governance rules are also more 
complex because account must be taken of the rules 
decided at the national level that organize what the 
local public authorities are allowed to do and how 
they can do. This local State capitalism should be 
more closely analysed.  
The governance rules must establish a balance 
between the autonomy of the agency necessary to 
manage the holdings and the democratic and political 
control that might be a more acute question at the 
local level with a more active dynamic participation of 
the civil society. Since the funds are public funds, we 
want more transparency and more accountability. 
Very often the “scandals” that appear in the 
management of local public enterprises are due to a 
bad balance between autonomy and control: too 
strong controls that limit too much the business 
opportunities and that conduct to develop ways to 
avoid them, versus too weak controls that allow the 
Board of Directors and the management to act 
without political approval. In my city we experienced 
such a scandal. The provincial and municipal 
authorities hold an investment company that 
manages holdings in electricity and gas transport 
networks, in electricity production, in a mobile phone 
company, in the regional airport, as well as in IT and 
in the financial sector. This company has developed 
partially based on the example of German 
Stadtwerke. We had to fire all the people in charge of 
this local investment company to re-establish a good 
governance system, a sound investment policy and a 
democratic control. 
 
Finally, I would like to congratulate Massimo, Luc and 
Philippe and all the authors for this impressive 
Handbook. Of course, even if this Handbook gives a 
very complete overview of the topic, it is still possible 
to find additional and promising research fields to be 
explored. I have suggested a few ones but my most 
important suggestion would be to discuss the content 
of this Handbook with people in charge of the 
management of State-owned enterprises. This 
discussion would benefit to both researchers and 
managers. I think that with the support of CIRIEC, you 
should organize such a discussion.  We would be 
happy to do so together, now that we can soon meet 
again in person and face-to-face. 
 
Thank you very much. 
